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FRIENDS OF THE COURT? THE ETHICS OF
AMICUS BRIEF WRITING IN FIRST
AMENDMENT LITIGATION
Allison Lucas*
The bane of lawyers is prolixity and duplication.... In an era of
heavy judicial caseloads and public impatience with the delays
and expense of litigation, we judges should be assiduous to bar
the gates to amicus curiae briefs that fail to present convincing
reasons why the parties' briefs do not give us all the help we
need for deciding the appeal.'
Introduction
In March 1993, James Perry, armed with an AR-7 rifle, strangled
a quadriplegic, eight-year-old boy, and shot to death the boy's
mother and his nurse in Rockville, Maryland.2 Perry was a con-
tract killer hired by the boy's father, who was interested in the al-
most $2 million award that the boy had won in a settlement for
injuries that had left him paralyzed for life.' In preparing for and
committing these murders, Perry followed - almost to the letter - a
book entitled Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Con-
tractors ("Hit Man"), a 130-page "how-to" on murdering and be-
coming a professional killer.4 Perry was convicted in 1996 of
capital murder, and subsequently the victims' families filed a civil
lawsuit against Paladin Press, the publishers of Hit Man, for aiding
and abetting the murders.
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2000; B.S. in Journalism,
Northwestern University, 1993. I would like to extend my appreciation to Professor
Benjamin Zipursky for his valuable insight and advice, and to James DeFilippis for his
endless encouragement.
1. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir.
1997) (Posner, C.J.).
2. See Perry v. Maryland, 686 A.2d 274, 276 (Md. 1996).
3. See Rice v. Paladin, 128 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W.
3558 (U.S. Apr. 20, 1998) (No. 97-1325). Paladin settled the case in May, 1999. See
infra note 5.
4. See Perry, 686 A.2d at 279.
5. See Paladin, 128 F.3d at 241. The case settled May 21, 1999, when Paladin
Press agreed to a "multimillion-dollar settlement" with relatives of the three people
murdered See Ruben Castaneda & Scott Wilson, "Hit Man" Publisher Settles Suit;
Littleton Made First Amendment Defense Dicey, WASH. POST, May 22, 1999, at Al. In
addition to that part of the settlement, Paladin agreed to make contributions to two
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The district court granted Paladin summary judgment, and in the
appeal that followed, a host of media lawyers submitted an amicus
curiae brief urging affirmation of the lower court decision.6 What
followed was not only a reversal of summary judgment, but also a
stunningly harsh critique of Paladin Press by Judge Luttig in the
Fourth Circuit for its potentially critical role in the murders.7 Lut-
tig also scolded the media organizations and their lawyers who
zealously advocated on behalf of Paladin Press.8
The example above is only one among many cases in which the
legal community and the community-at-large have become wary of
enthusiastic support thrown behind a defendant, especially in situa-
tions where the defendant's conduct is egregious and the outcome
is legally significant. This Note seeks to explore the ethics of writ-
ing amicus briefs, specifically in defamation and privacy cases
where the conduct of defendants may seem indefensible to many
mainstream journalists and their attorneys. By using two recent
First Amendment cases, Rice v. Paladin and Khawar v. Globe, In-
ternational,9 it will illustrate the potential conflicts and usefulness
of writing such briefs. Part I will discuss the history of amicus cu-
riae briefs, their purposes and cases where amicus briefs have been
particularly helpful or persuasive for judges. It will also discuss
Chief Judge Richard Posner's recent move to limit their use in the
Seventh Circuit. Part II will discuss Paladin and Khawar and also
review cases in which there was a strong public sentiment against
the application of First Amendment protections to particular
speech. Part III will analyze the debate on each side, arguing that
despite the outrageous conduct of a media defendant, it is proper
for other media lawyers to continue the practice of amici submis-
sions. However, even though there is a moral obligation to con-
tinue representing a client in such cases, the scores of people in the
media and general public may be justified in feeling that media
organizations should not rush to defend any and all media conduct
for which a publisher might be liable. This Note will conclude that
charities chosen by the plaintiff, and to give the plaintiffs the remaining 700 copies of
the book. See id.
6. See Brief of ABC, Inc., et. al. as Amici Curiae, Rice v. Paladin 128 F.3d 233
(4th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2412) [hereinafter ABC Paladin Amicus Brief] (on file with
the Fordham Urban Law Journal). For further discussion of the amicus briefs, see
part II, infra.
7. See Paladin, 128 F.3d 233 passim.
8. See id. at 265.
9. 965 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1998).
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despite these justifications, it would be a bad precedent to start
dismissing amici concerns.
I: The History and Policies of Amicus Brief Writing
A. History of the Amici
Some scholars suggest that the use of amicus curiae is rooted in
ancient Roman law,' ° where the amicus was usually court-ap-
pointed and offered non-binding opinions on law unfamiliar to the
court." However, the role for which amicus briefs are known to-
day became a common practice in England by the 17th Century.1 2
The function of the amicus curiae at common law was a form of
oral "shepardizing," the bringing up of cases not known to the
judge. 3 In this role, the amicus submission originally was intended
to provide a court with impartial legal information that was beyond
its notice or expertise, which is where the name amicus curiae, or
"friend of the court" is derived. 4 In many cases, the amicus was a
bystander who acted on behalf of infants, and also called attention
to manifest error, to the death of a party to the proceeding, and to
existing applicable statutes.' 5 The amicus did not need to be an
attorney, and the general attitude of the courts was to welcome
such aid, since "it is for the honor of a court of justice to avoid
error.
', 6
The courts expanded amicus participation in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Judges and attorneys alike appointed them-
selves amici and advised each other in client representation,1 7 over-
coming the problem of representation of third parties in common
lawsuits.1 8 In England, this expanded participation also included
10. 1 BOUVIER's LAW DICTIONARY 188 (Rawle's 3d ed. 1914), cited in Judith S.
Kaye, One Judge's View of "Friends of the Court", N.Y. ST. BAR J., Apr. 1989, at 8, 9.
11. Comment, The Amicus Curiae, 55 N.W. U. L. REV. 469, 469 n.3 (1960).
12. See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy,
72 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1964).
13. See id.
14. See Alexander Wohl, Friends with Agendas, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 46.
15. See Krislov, supra note 12, at 695.
16. Id. (citing The Protector v. Geering, 145 Eng. Rep. 394 (Ex. 1656)).
17. See Krislov, supra note 12, at 696.
18. See id. Problems of representation of third party interests under the common
law system were plentiful. The complex federal system meant not only that state and
national interests were conflicted, but also that an even greater number of conflicted
public interests were potentially unrepresented in the courts of private suits. Id. at
697-99. Courts, "where obvious injustice would be caused by lack of representation,
allowed outsiders to intervene generally by exercise of what was called 'the inherent
power of a court of law to control its processes.'... [O]ften the court merely extended
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taking sides. For example, in Coxe v. Phillips,19 an amicus repre-
sented a spouse's interests in an action on a promissory note, de-
spite the fact that he was not party to the suit.2 0
This pattern followed in the United States as well, where the
amicus moved from being a friend of the court to a friend of a
specific party. The practice started in the United States in the nine-
teenth century to address concerns of collusion between two adver-
saries.21 "The amicus is treated as a potential litigant in future
cases, as an ally of one of the parties, or as the representative of an
interest not otherwise represented.... [T]he institution of the ami-
cus curiae brief has moved from neutrality to partisanship, from
friendship to advocacy. 22
Over the last century and a half, some courts have insisted on
neutrality from an amicus, z3 and others have accepted only limited
advocacy.24 However, the majority of courts recognize that amici
need not be completely disinterested, and an amicus "who takes a
legal position and presents legal arguments in support of it [fulfills]
a perfectly permissible role. '2 5
B. The Current Amici Curiae
There is little doubt that amicus briefs have shaped the law. The
most visible court to be influenced by amici has been the Supreme
Court, and one of the most influential amicus curiae has been the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"). a6 For example, in
1961 the ACLU convinced the Supreme Court to apply the exclu-
the privilege of filing a brief 'by leave of the court."' Id. at 699 (quoting Krippendorf
v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 283 (1884)).
19. 95 Eng. Rep. 152 (K.B. 1736).
20. Id. The amicus in this case not only had the action vacated, but also was able
to convince the court that the two parties involved were collusive, and had them
found in contempt of court. See Krislov, supra note 12, at 696-97.
21. See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823) (granting amicus request for rehearing,
due to nonrepresentation of state interests).
22. Krislov, supra note 12, at 704.
23. See Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Saranac River Power Corp., 278
N.Y.S. 203 (1935)(refusing to consider an amicus brief because it was partisan).
24. See United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165 (6th Cir. 1991).
25. Gary F. Smith & Beth E. Terrell, The Amicus Curiae: A Powerful Friend for
Poverty Law Advocates, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 772, 776 (Nov.-Dec. 1995) (quoting
Funbus Sys. Inc. v. California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 801 F.2d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 1986).
A more detailed discussion of the history of amicus briefs is beyond the scope of this
discussion. For a comprehensive discussion of this topic, see generally Krislov, supra
note 12.
26. See Gregg Ivers & Karen O'Connor, Friends as Foes: The Amicus Curiae Par-
ticipation and Effectiveness of the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans for
Effective Law Enforcement in Criminal Cases, 1969-1982, 9 L. & POL'Y 161 (1987).
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sionary rule, previously applied only in federal actions, to the
states.27 From 1961 to 1966, the ACLU participated as amicus cu-
riae in such groundbreaking decisions as Gideon v. Wainwright,28
Escobedo v. Illinois29 and Miranda v. Arizona.30 During a twelve-
year period from 1969-1981, the ACLU participated in forty-four
percent of all criminal cases in which an amicus brief was filed.31
There are many other circumstances in which the Court has used
amicus briefs to shape its opinions. In Romer v. Evans,32 Justice
Kennedy's opinion seemed to accept the argument offered by Pro-
fessor Laurence Tribe of Harvard and several other constitutional
scholars, that a Colorado amendment constituted a per se violation
of the equal protection guarantee under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.33 In three separate antitrust cases in the Supreme Court's
1991-92 term, amici seem to have influenced the court.34 And,
from 1981 to 1989, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") filed briefs on the merits as amicus in nine Supreme Court
cases - the SEC's views were adopted by the Court in eight of those
cases.
35
27. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
[N]either of the principal litigants raised the issue of the exclusionary rule in
their briefs or at oral argument, [but] the ACLU [in its amicus curiae brief]
had asked the Court to find that evidence which is unlawfully and illegally
obtained.., not be permitted into a state proceeding and that its production
is a violation of the Federal Constitution, the Fourth Amendment and Four-
teenth Amendment. We have no hesitancy about it, because we think it is a
necessary part of due process.
Ivers & O'Connor, supra note 26, at 163.
28. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to trial includes
the right to effective assistance of counsel).
29. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (excluding evidence on a finding that denying an accused
person's request for assistance constitutes a denial of the right to assistance of
counsel).
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (excluding statements of a defendant when procedural
safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion were not used).
31. See Ivers & O'Connor, supra note 26, at 168. In the 1998-99 term, the ACLU
submitted 16 amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme Court. See ACLU Web Site (visited
June 25, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/court/summ-95.html>.
32. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a Colorado voters' initiative that barred
enactment of the state and local laws or regulations protecting homosexuals from
discrimination).
33. See Wohl, supra note 14, at 48.
34. See Stephen Calkins, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 269 (1993)(discussing the role
that amici played in FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621 (1992), Morales v. TWA, 504
U.S. 374 (1992), and Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
35. Id. The court accepted the SEC's views in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988), Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 377 (1983), Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 682-83 (1985),
1999l 1609
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
The use of amicus briefs has flourished in local courts as well. In
Polaroid v. Travelers Indemnity Co. ,36 even though the Massachu-
setts court ultimately rejected the amicus corporation's position,
the court remarked that it found the brief to contain "the most
comprehensive and instructive argument" on appellant's behalf.37
The Polaroid court also indicated that the presence of amicus briefs
prompted them to address issues they might not otherwise have
addressed.38 In several cases, courts have indicated that the views
of amici influenced their opinions.39
Currently, courts have found briefs so effective in a variety of
types of litigation that some judges have even requested that cer-
tain advocates submit briefs.40 For example, in Massachusetts, the
Supreme Judicial Court has requested amicus briefs in connection
with its advisory opinions to the legislature. a In recent years, the
Appeals Court in Massachusetts requested an amicus brief in at
least two cases (both raising landlord-tenant issues).42 During a
five and one half year period, about 200 cases in the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts involved amicus briefs.43
1. Reasons for amicus submission
There are several reasons why amicus briefs are requested. First,
an amicus curiae can furnish a statewide or national perspective to
show the legal or social consequences that a decision could have.44
Second, it can be used to explain how a regulation or statute at
Gould v. Ruenfenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 702 (1985), ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards Inc. v. Berner, 472
U.S. 299, 300 (1985) and Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 649 (1986). The court
declined to adopt the SEC's position in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481
U.S. 69 (1987). See id.
36. 610 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1993) (upholding insurers' refusal to settle pollution
claims of insured).
37. Id. at 920 n.15.
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Fiore v. Washington County Community Mental Health Ctr., 960
F.2d 229, 231 n.1 (1st Cir. 1992) (adopting recommendation of amici); Harris v. Capi-
tol Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1991) (adopting an amici's point that
plaintiff's interpretation of a statute would generate massive expenses within the
states's business communitites).
40. See E. Susan Garsh & Joanne D'Alcomo, Role of the Amicus Brief, MASSA-
CHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN MASSACHU-
SETrs §§ 17, 17.3 (1996).
41. See id.
42. See Poncz v. Loftin, 607 N.E.2d 765, 766 (Mass. 1993); Jinwala v. Bizzaro, 505
N.E.2d 904, 904 n.1 (1987).
43. Garsh & D'Alcomo, supra note 40, at § 17.3.
44. See id.
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issue fits within a larger regulatory or statutory framework.45
Third, the amicus can furnish additional information to describe
how a particular industry operates.46 Often, an amicus may have
more familiarity with an issue on appeal than the parties them-
selves.47 Finally, it can apprise the court of the details of another
case pending in the system posing related issues.48
For these reasons, the use of amicus briefs in appellate and
Supreme Court litigation has exploded since the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. In the 1995-96 term, amicus briefs were
filed in nearly ninety percent of the cases the Supreme Court de-
cided;49 by contrast, during the 1980-81 term, seventy-one percent
of the Court's cases decided by opinion had amicus filings, and
only thirty-five percent of the cases decided in the 1965-66 term
included such briefs.5 0 In the 1998-99 term, ninety-five percent of
cases argued before the Supreme Court had at least one amicus
filing.51 The numbers are even more dramatic than they appear,
since it is common for several amicus organizations to file briefs in
a given case. 2
2. Amicus Procedures
Both federal and state courts usually are lenient about granting
motions for leave to file an amicus brief. The showing that a pro-
posed amicus must make is minimal; it is much lower than the
threshold that must be met for intervention by a third party.53 An
intervenor must serve a motion that states the grounds for inter-
vention and accompany a pleading setting forth the claim or de-
fense for which intervention is sought. 4
In the Supreme Court, the rules for submitting amicus briefs are
simple. An amicus brief submitted before the Court's considera-
tion of a writ of certiori may be filed if accompanied by the written
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. David G. Knibb, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL: A MANUAL ON
PRACTICE IN THE US COURT OF APPEALS § 29, 29.14 (3d. ed. 1997).
48. See Garsh & D'Alcomo, supra note 40, at § 17.3.
49. See Wohl, supra note 14, at 46.
50. See Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. Rnv. 603, 603
(1984).
51. This statistic is based on a review of 90 cases argued before the Supreme Court
this term.
52. See Ennis, supra note 50, at 603.
53. A party may intervene as a matter of right, or by permission. FED. R. Civ. P.
24(a)-(b).
54. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(c).
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consent of all parties, or if the court grants leave to file." An ami-
cus brief may also be filed in a case before the Court for oral argu-
ment if accompanied by the written consent of all parties, or if the
Court grants leave.56 The briefs must indicate whether counsel for
a party authored the brief in whole or in part, and must identify
every person or entity, other than the amicus curiae, who made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the
brief.57 The rules are the same in the Federal Courts of Appeals.58
One of the key limitations that courts have enunciated through
opinions, is that an amicus may not raise issues that the parties
could have but did not.59
The rules of submitting amicus briefs in state courts vary with
each state. For example, in New York State, an amicus party must
satisfy the court that at least one of the following criteria has been
met: (1) the parties are not capable of a full and adequate presenta-
tion, and the movant could remedy that situation; (2) the movant
would invite the court's attention to law or arguments that might
otherwise escape its consideration; or (3) an amicus brief would
otherwise be of special assistance to the court. In addition, an ami-
cus brief may not introduce new issues, but may only relate to the
issues raised by the parties.6 °
C. Limiting The Use Of Amicus Briefs
In 1989, Judge Judith Kaye (then Associate Judge of New York
State's Court of Appeals - now Chief Justice) wrote her views on
the worth of amicus briefs.6" She praised the Court of Appeals'
expressed interest in receiving amicus curiae submissions,62 and
said that despite the transformation from "selfless servant[s] of his-
55. See S. CT. R. 37.2(a).
56. See S. CT. R. 37.3(a).
57. See S. CT. R. 37.6. An exception is made for a brief written on behalf of the
United States. See S. Cr. R. 37.4.
58. See FED. R. App. P. 29.
59. See United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1979) (refusing to
consider arguments not raised by the parties); Preservation Coalition Inc. v. Pierce,
667 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1982) (refusing to consider, on appeal, issues raised by parties
below, but not amicus).
60. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 500.11(e) (1998).
61. See Kaye, supra note 10, at 9.
62. See id. The Court of Appeals amended its rules in 1988 so that when the court
each week informed the public about its new filings, it also issued the following invita-
tion to interested persons: "The subject matter of the newly filed cases may suggest
appropriate motions and participation which the Court welcomes." Id.
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tory" to their advocacy role today, "the amicus curiae ... retain[s]
the mark [of] a friend. 63
Eight years later, Judge Kaye's words were challenged. In Ryan
v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission,64 Judge Posner denied
a motion for leave to file an amicus brief because the brief would
repeat arguments made by a party.65 In a short opinion, Posner
argued that closer scrutiny of such briefs was necessary because the
vast majority of amicus briefs did not materially assist the judges in
deciding the case at hand.66 He noted several situations where an
amicus brief should normally be allowed.67 The first situation is
when a party is not represented at all. The second is when the
amicus has an interest in some other case that may be affected
through the decision in the present case (though not affected
enough to entitle the amicus to intervene and become a party in
the present case). The third is when the amicus has unique infor-
mation or perspective that can help the court more than the liti-
gants' lawyers can.68 "Otherwise, leave to file an amicus curiae
brief should be denied. '69
Other scholars argued Judge Posner's point long before the Ryan
decision. Two law professors assert that in certain areas, such as
social science, amicus briefs are too often designed to persuade
rather than inform the court, and thus, the attorneys are not guided
by scientific norms of neutrality and objectivity, but by the ideol-
ogy of advocacy. 7° "The desire to win the case encourages the
amici to distort or ignore any damaging social science findings."'71
However, it is reliance on Judge Posner's criticism of the amicus
brief in Ryan that has led other circuit courts to preclude amici
63. See id. at 13.
64. 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997).
65. See id. The Chicago Board of Trade moved under FED. R. App. P. 29 for leave
to file an amicus brief in support of the petitioner, who was challenging a disciplinary
order of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Judge Posner originally de-
nied the motion without a statement of reasons. This opinion stems from a further
motion by the Board of Trade, asking Posner to explain his decision on the motion.
See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. These sentiments are echoed in Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 191 U.S.
555, 556 (1903), American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh,
699 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1983), Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1970) and
United States v. Gotti, 755 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
70. Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Sci-
ence: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 100 (1993).
71. Id.
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from offering their opinions in cases.7 2 In addition, some state
courts have taken the same position. In Ferguson v. Brick,73 the
Arkansas Supreme Court's attitude toward amici was almost hos-
tile. 4 The court traced the descent of amicus briefs, from helpful
friendships, to unabashed advocacy, and on to mere lobbying.
"Henceforth, we will deny permission to file a brief when the pur-
pose is nothing more than to make a political endorsement of the
basic brief."' 76 The legal press has also used Judge Posner's opinion
to reiterate that a "friend of the court" is quite different from a
"friend of a party."
77
Although some courts have followed Judge Posner's lead, some
lawyers have instead cited the dangers of his restrictions. Luther
Munford, a prominent appellate attorney, argues that for decades
partisan interests may befriend a court by providing useful infor-
mation, even if it benefits only one side. 78 To illustrate his position,
Munford points to the 1908 Brandeis brief in favor of child labor
regulation,79 written on behalf of the National Consumers League,
as well as the important briefs written by the ACLU8' and the
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.81
72. See e.g., United States v. Hunter, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9869 (D. Vt. 1998)
(denying the American Civil Liberties Foundation of Vermont its motion to file brief
due to lack of convincing reason as to why an amicus brief was desirable); United
Stationers, Inc. v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 1279, 1288 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (denying
several parties motions because it determined that the government and stationers
"adequately and thoroughly addressed the issue at bar").
73. 649 S.W.2d 397 (Ark. 1983).
74. See id at 398.
75. See id. at 397-98.
76. Id. at 173.
77. See Amicus Briefs Must Add Something, 13 No. 1 FED. LITIGATOR 30 (Jan.
1998).
78. See Luther Munford, Listening to Friends of the Court, 84 A.B.A. J. 128 (Aug.
1998). Munford is the former president of the American Academy of Appellate
Lawyers.
79. Louis D. Brandeis' brief for the defendant figured prominently in the opinion
of Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (restricting women's working hours on the
premise that a woman's primary function was to bear children). The brief contained
two pages of legal arguments, but more than 100 pages referring to factual reports and
existing laws affecting the parties. Briefs with this type of jurisprudence and constitu-
tional advocacy have come to be known as "Brandeis briefs."
80. See discussion, supra notes 26-31, and accompanying text.
81. The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in 1989 persuaded the Supreme Court
to limit the retroactivity of a new constitutional ruling. See Munford, supra note 78, at
128.
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3. Ethical guidelines for submission
Although there are no ethical code provisions governing the sub-
mission of amicus briefs, some portions of the ABA Model Rules
and the Model Code indicate that it is ethical for an attorney to
submit a brief if it would amount to helpful representation of his or
her client.82 In addition, discipline may be imposed on a lawyer if
he or she neglects a client matter; 3 however, since the topic of this
Note deals with clients who are not parties to a litigation, it is un-
likely these provisions would apply.
H. First Amendment Defendants And Their "Friends"
A. Rice v. Paladin
1. The facts and lower court decision
In early 1992, James Perry responded to a catalogue solicitation
by Paladin Press,81 and ordered two of the publisher's books: Hit
Man, a how-to hit manual, and How to Make Disposable Silencers.
A little more than a year later, Perry murdered Mildred Horn, her
quadriplegic son Trevor, and Trevor's nurse.85 Perry was found
guilty of murder on three counts,86 and subsequently, the victims'
representatives filed a civil action against Paladin Press for aiding
and abetting Perry in the commission of his murders through the
publication of Hit Man's killing instructions.8 7 The U.S. District
Court for Maryland granted summary judgment to the publishers
because Paladin's speech was not excepted by the "imminent law-
less action" exception cited in the landmark First Amendment case
Brandenburg v. Ohio.88
82. See infra Part III.C for a fuller discussion of the Model Rules and Model
Codes.
83. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1994) [here-
inafter Model Code].
84. Rice v. Paladin, 128 F.3d 233, 241 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997).
85. See id. at 239.
86. See Perry v. State, 686 A.2d 274 (Md. 1996).
87. Rice v. Paladin, 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996). It is interesting, although not
germane to the discussion, to note that the author of Hit Man, Rex Feral, was actually
a divorced mother of two when she wrote the book in 1983. Originally, she submitted
a novel, but Paladin's editors wanted a how-to. She got her ideas from books, televi-
sion, movies, newspapers, police officers, her karate instructor and a lawyer friend.
See David Montgomery, If Books Could Kill; This Publisher Offers Lessons in Mur-
der. Now He's a Target Himself, WASH. POST, July 26, 1998, at F1.
88. Paladin, 940 F. Supp. at 845-46. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969),
was the landmark Supreme Court case stating that a statute that purported to punish
mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others
merely to advocate the describe type of action, was a violation of the First and Four-
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The plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit. A host of promi-
nent media entities, including the American Broadcasting Com-
pany, America Online, the New York Times Company, Society of
Professional Journalists, and the Washington Post Company (here-
inafter "Paladin amici"), submitted an amicus curiae brief to the
Court of Appeals urging affirmation of the district court decision.89
The amici argued that under Brandenburg, Paladin's books contain
protected speech, because the books do not incite imminent lawless
action. They also argued that the First Amendment, does not yield
to the law of aiding and abetting90 and concluded that the lawsuit
threatened entire genres of expression.91
2. The appellate decision
In April 1997, the Court of Appeals overturned the District
Court decision, and found that the book was not entitled to protec-
tion under the First Amendment's free speech clause because it
was not merely "abstract advocacy. '92 Judge Luttig first quoted
extensive passages from Hit Man, noting that "the court has even
felt it necessary to omit portions of these few illustrative passages
in order to minimize the danger to the public from their repetition
herein." 93 He then illustrated the striking similarity between
quoted passages from the Hit Man and James Perry's actions in
1993, and stated that a reasonable jury clearly could conclude that
Paladin aided and abetted in Perry's triple murder 94 based on the
stipulations of the parties95
teenth Amendments. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449. The courts have used Bran-
denburg to exonerate defendants, absent a showing of "imminent lawless action."
89. See ABC Paladin Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 2-3.
90. See id. at 17.
91. See id. at 22-27. The amici cite various publications, such as Abbie Hoffman,
Steal This Book (1971), Malcolm X, By Any Means Necessary (2d ed. 1992), Jonathan
Swift, A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor People in Ireland From
Being a Burden to Their Parents or Country (1729), as examples of threatened publi-
cations. See id. at 4-5.
92. Rice v. Paladin, 128 F.3d 233, 233 (4th Cir. 1997). The judge, in a 32-page
decision, spent a good part of the opinion quoting graphic portions of the Hit Man
text and comparing it to Perry's strikingly similar actions. For example, "Hit Man
specifically instructs its audience of killers to shoot the victim through the eyes if
possible: 'At least three shots should be fired to insure quick and sure death ....
[A]im for the head - preferably the eye sockets if you are a sharpshooter.' James
Perry shot Mildred Horn and Janice Saunders two or three times through the eyes."
Id. at 240.
93. Paladin, 128 F.3d at 239 n.1.
94. See id at 242-43.
95. Those stipulations include an acknowledgement by Paladin that:
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Paladin Press assisted Perry, according to Luttig, by providing
detailed instructions on the techniques of murder and murder for
hire with the specific intent of aiding and abetting the commission
of these violent crimes. 96 He argued that this case bore no resem-
blance to a host of First Amendment cases in which the defendant
promoted "theoretical advocacy.
97
3. Legal community response
The reaction from the legal community was similar. Rodney
Smolla, a leading First Amendment lawyer, shifted away from his
usual role to become one plaintiff's attorney. Writer and attorney
Stuart Taylor agrees with Smolla's decision. "A murder manual
intentionally marketed to would-be contract killers (along with
fantasists and others) doesn't strike me as the kind of 'freedom of
speech' that the framers sought to protect. 9
8
Smolla and Taylor are not alone. One critic champions govern-
ment regulation of speech such as Paladin's, that provides detailed,
step-by-step instructions about how to commit violent felonies.99
Another detractor compares Paladin's liability to that of a gun
dealer or a bar owner, saddling publishers with a duty to desist
from publication of such books.1°° Some scholars echo Judge Lut-
tig's view, dismissing concerns that a decision unfavorable to Pala-
din would implicate a host of authors, moviemakers and other
[I]n marketing Hit Man, Paladin 'intended to attract and assist criminals and
would-be criminals who desire information and instructions on how to com-
mit crimes' but also that it 'intended and had knowledge' that Hit Man actu-
ally 'would be used, upon receipt, by criminals and would-be criminals to
plan and execute the crime of murder for hire.
Id. at 241.
96. See id. at 255. Judge Luttig's opinion notes that in cases where aiding and
abetting liability was to be imposed on publishers, there is an intent requirement. He
states that Paladin Press:
[S]tipulated to a set of facts which establish as a matter of law that the pub-
lisher is civilly liable for aiding and abetting James Perry in his triple murder,
unless the First Amendment absolutely bars the imposition of liability upon
a publisher for assisting in the commission of criminal acts.
Id. at 241.
97. Id. at 249 (citing Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 235 (1961)).
98. Stuart Taylor Jr., A Constitutional Suicide Pact?, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 1996,
at 23.
99. See Avital T. Zer-Ilan, Note, The First Amendment and Murder Manuals, 106
YALE L.J. 2697, 2697 (1997) ("Instructional speech like the kind found in Rice is
easily distinguishable from general advocacy, description, opinion or political speech.
For example, speech that provides instructions on how to blow up buildings or com-
mit murder, torture, or rape falls well within this exception.").
100. Bruce Fein, Crime, Responsibility and Free Speech, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 27,
1996, at A17.
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artists. They question whether holding Hit Man's publisher liable
would really endanger the First Amendment rights of these media
entities in light of the historic purposes of the Amendment.101
4. Amici concerns
After his assessment of the case and the district court's opinion,
Judge Luttig sternly addressed the media amici's brief. His con-
demnation focused on the fact that the Paladin amici stood behind
a defendant that knowingly and intentionally gave a dangerous
weapon to a murderer.
That the national media organizations would feel obliged to vig-
orously defend Paladin's assertion of a constitutional right to in-
tentionally and knowingly assist murderers with technical
information which Paladin admits it intended and knew would
be used immediately in the commission of murder and other
crimes against society is, to say the least, breathtaking.10 2
Judge Luttig further stated that it should be apparent to all par-
ties involved that the First Amendment values that Paladin and
amici sought to protect would not be adversely affected by allowing
plaintiff's action against Paladin to proceed. "[N]either the exten-
sive briefing by the parties and the numerous amici in this case, nor
the exhaustive research which the court itself has undertaken, has
revealed even a single case that we regard as factually analogous to
this case. '10 3
Richard Smolla agrees with Judge Luttig about Paladin's media
amici. He compares Paladin's amici with those who advocate simi-
lar protection for the publisher of a terrorist manual that provides
detailed instructions on how to smuggle bombs onto airplanes.
Similarly, Smolla indicates that the amici advocate for publication
of manuals on how to steal nuclear materials from Russia, build a
nuclear device and blow up a few million people. 104 "How immi-
nent would the intended explosion have to be to satisfy [the 'immi-
nent danger' exception to First Amendment protections cited in]
101. Amy Dilworth, Note, Murder in the Abstract: The First Amendment and the
Misappropriation of Brandenburg, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 565, 587. See also
Bennett L. Gershman, Perverting the First Amendment, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 8, 1998, at 2.
102. Paladin, 128 F.3d at 265.
103. Id. Amici also argues that recognizing this type of cause of action against Pal-
adin predicated on aiding and abetting will subject broadcasters and publishers to
liability whenever someone imitates or "copies" conduct that is either described or
depicted in their broadcasts, publications or moves. The judge dismissed this conten-
tion as "simply not true." Id.
104. See Taylor, supra note 98, at 23.
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Brandenburg? Is the Constitution a suicide pact?'' °5 - Law profes-
sor Bennett Gershman argues that when the free speech propo-
nents champion subterfuge, the First Amendment is perverted and
its friends are discredited. 1 6 He further argues that the media's
complicity in Paladin's "audacious misuse of the First Amendment
should be underscored,' 0 7 and that the inability or unwillingness
of presumably responsible members of the media to make elemen-
tary, common sense distinctions raises serious questions about their
judgment. 108 He states that if defenders of the First Amendment
fail to grasp that "simple but overarching truth, and fail to brand
Paladin's corruption for what it is, then they . . . delegitimize
themselves."'0 9
B. Khawar v. Globe, International
1. The Facts
A similar sentiment to that stated in Paladin was enunciated in
the recently decided case of Khawar v. Globe International" In
November 1988, Roundtable Publishing published a book entitled
The Senator Must Die: The Murder of Robert Kennedy, alleging
that the Iranian Shah's secret police, working together with the
Mafia, carried out the 1968 assassination of Robert Kennedy. The
book contained four photographs of a young man standing in a
group of people around Senator Kennedy at the Ambassador Ho-
tel in Los Angeles shortly before he was assassinated."' It identi-
fied the man in pictures as Ali Ahmand, and alleged that he was
the real Kennedy murderer.
Five months after the book was published, the Globe, a weekly
tabloid newspaper, ran an article containing an uncritical summary
of the book's allegations. The Globe enlarged one of the photo-
graphs in the book, and added an arrow pointing to the accused
man, and again identified him as the assassin." 2 The man in the
photograph was actually named Khalid Khawar, not Ahmand; he
was a photographer who had been hired by an Indian newspaper to
write about the Los Angeles convention. In August 1989, Khawar,
105. Id.
106. See Gershman, supra note 101, at 2.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. 965 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3705 (U.S. May 17, 1999)
(No. 98-1491).
111. See id. at 698-99.
112. See id.
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who received death threats following the Globe article's release,
sued the Globe, Roundtable and the book's author, Robert Mor-
row, for libel." 3
The jury in the case granted judgment to Khawar in the amount
of $1.75 million, and held that: "(1) the Globe article contained
statements about Khawar that were false and defamatory; (2)
Globe published the article negligently and with malice or oppres-
sion; (3) with respect to Kennedy's assassination, Khawar was a
private rather than public figure; and (4) the Globe article was a
neutral and accurate report of the Morrow book. 11 4 Since the last
two determinations were advisory only, the trial court ruled as a
matter of law that the article was not an accurate and neutral re-
port.11 5 In affirming the trial court ruling, the California Court of
Appeals held that California had not adopted a neutral reportage
privilege for private figures, and therefore it was not necessary to
decide whether the Globe article was a neutral report.11 6
2. Neutral Reportage Defense
In this case, the media's concern was the issue of applying neu-
tral reportage to private figures. Neutral reportage is a privilege
available in some states that gives a First Amendment defense to
publishers who republish defamatory statements." 7 The Second
Circuit defined neutral reportage in 1977 in Edwards v. National
Audubon Society, noting that "[W]hen a responsible, prominent or-
ganization . . . makes serious charges against a public figure, the
First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting
of those charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regard-
113. See id. at 699. Although Morrow defaulted, and Roundtable settled with
Khawar before trial, the trial court vacated Morrow's default and ultimately entered
judgment .in his favor, based on findings that Khawar could not be named in and
could not be identified from the photographs in Morrow's book. See id.
114. Id. at 699.
115. See id. at 700. The trial court's decision that the Globe article was not a neu-
tral report was based on its finding that although Khawar could be identified from the
Globe photo, which included an arrow pointing directly at Khawar, it was impossible
to identify Khawar from the smaller, darker and less distinct image of him that ap-
peared in the Morrow book. See id.
116. See Khawar v. Globe, 54 Cal. Rptr.2d 92, 102-04 (1996).
117. See Khawar, 965 P.2d 696, 704 (Cal. 1998). The privilege is similar to the com-
mon law privilege of "fair report," which California codified in CAL. CIVIL CODE
§§ 47(d) and 47(e). See id.
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ing their validity."" 8 The Supreme Court has never ruled on the
neutral reportage privilege. 1 9
Media conglomerates like ABC and CBS, publishers such as
Knight-Ridder, and associations like the California First Amend-
ment Coalition and the Radio-Television News Directors Associa-
tion submitted a total of three amicus briefs 20 ("Globe amici")
urged the court to reverse the Court of Appeals, decision. The
briefs asserted that the neutral reportage privilege extends protec-
tion to the media where they accurately and neutrally report that
claims have been made about private individuals involved in public
controversy.' 21
The briefs offered several other reasons for reversal. The first
was that the court analysis did not focus on the republication as-
pect of the Globe's defense.' 22 A duty to reinvestigate those claims
would bar the media from informing the public about many news-
worthy matters, in violation of the First Amendment. In addition,
the ABC brief cited Time v. Pape,23 which states that in the repub-
lication context, truth or falsity and actual malice are judged by
examining whether the media accurately republished the underly-
ing claims.' 24
3. California's Ruling
The California Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision.
Justice Kennard declined to address the amici's concerns about
neutral reportage for private figures, and instead affirmed the
lower court opinion on this individual's status as a private person
for the purpose of defamation law. 125
Justice Kennard concluded that Khawar was not a public figure
in relation to the article 126 and stated that California does not rec-
118. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing
Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971)).
119. Khawar, 965 P.2d 696, 705 (1998) (citing Harte-Hanks Commuunications v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) (declining to decide the issue)).
120. See Brief of ABC, Inc. et al. [hereinafter ABC Khawar Amicus Brief]; Brief of
Los Angeles Times et al. [hereinafter L.A. Times Amicus Brief]; and Letter Brief of
San Jose Mercury News, Inc. and Knight-Ridder Pub., Inc., as Amici Curiae, Khawar
v. Globe, 965 P.2d 696 (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
121. See L.A. Times Amicus Brief at 20-22; ABC Amicus Brief at 7-13.
122. See L.A. Times Amicus Brief at 15.
123. 1 U.S. 279 (1971).
124. See id., cited in ABC Khawar Amicus Brief, supra note 120, at 15-20.
125. Khawar, 965 P.2d at 703.
126. See id. at 698. Khawar was a young journalist at the time who was photo-
graphed near Kennedy, a prominent politician, moments before his death. However,
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ognize neutral reportage for private figures. She declined to decide
whether California recognized such a privilege for public officials
or public figures, stating:127
Only rarely will the report of false and defamatory accusations
against a person who is neither a public official nor a public fig-
ure provide information of value in the resolution of a contro-
versy over a matter of public concern. On the other hand, the
report of such accusations can have a devastating effect on the
reputation of the accused individual, who has not voluntarily
elected to encounter an increased risk of defamation and who
may lack sufficient media access to counter the accusations.128
While the California courts did not address the amici as the
Fourth Circuit did in Paladin, the mainstream press did. Mike Wal-
lace, CBS anchor for the television show "60 Minutes," ran a story
criticizing the media (including his own network). 29 Speaking to a
lawyer who worked on the amicus brief in support of the Globe,
Wallace stated "I know damn well that I would never in a million
years have been permitted to put on 60 Minutes what the Globe
put in their magazine. '"130 Howard Kurtz, press critic for the Wash-
ington Post added, "[t]he nation's top news organizations have a
knee-jerk tendency to rush to the defense of any journalist in
trouble. They're afraid [the Khawar case] would set some kind of
legal precedent. I don't think we should apologize for the worst
excesses of our business. '' 3 Specific to this case, the Globe did not
do any journalism homework to insure a fair report.132 But the ar-
gument was the same as in the Paladin case, in that the media enti-
ties involved in writing the amicus briefs compromised their
journalistic ethics by supporting the Globe.
C. Other "Friends of the Courts"
Both Paladin and Khawar are good examples of the public's out-
raged response to the defense of the media's conduct, but they are
not the only cases. For example, in September 1997, the death of
he was never a suspect, was never publicized and never sought to influence public
discussion on the topic. See id.
127. See id. at 707 ("Republication of accusations made against private figures is
never protected by the neutral reportage privilege.").
128. Id.
129. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 6, 1998) (transcript on file with the
Fordham Urban Law Journal).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Khawar v. Globe, 965 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1998).
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Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed in Paris resulted in a backlash
against the paparazzi and their tactics. 133
Scrutiny has hit the mainstream media as well. When Richard
Jewell, a security guard in Atlanta, became a suspect in the Centen-
nial Olympic Park bombing during the Olympics in July, 1996, the
media essentially tried and convicted him in the press.134 Federal
prosecutors exonerated Jewell almost three months later;135 he sub-
sequently filed defamation suits against many major news
organizations.1
36
In 1992, a police officer's family sued rap artist Tupac Shakur,
Atlantic Records, and Time Warner when the officer was shot by a
19-year-old man who had been listening to Shakur's album, 2pa-
calypse Now. 137 On this case's heels, Ice-T also attracted attention
when he released the song "Cop Killer" from his album, Body
Count. The release of the song, and songs such as those found on
2pacalypse Now led to an all-out attempt by groups such as the
Combined Law Enforcement Association of Texas, and people like
Oliver North and former Representative Susan Molinari to censor
the music. 138 The protests seemed to have the desired effect. Due
133. See James C. Goodale & Jeremy Feigelson, Greater Legal Restrictions on the
Paparazzi?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 22, 1997, at 4.
134. See, e.g., Kathy Scruggs & Ron Martz, FBI Suspects "Hero" Guard May Have
Planted Bomb, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 30, 1996, at iX (stating that "Richard
Jewell ... fits the profile of the lone bomber. This profile generally includes a frus-
trated white man who is a former police officer, member of the military or police
'wannabe' who seeks to become a hero."), Andrea Peyser, Who Checked "Rambo"
Crossing Guard's Record?, N.Y. POST, July 31, 1996, at 3 ("He was a fat, failed former
sheriff's deputy[.]"). Jewell, initially identified as a hero for discovering a knapsack
containing the bomb, was turned into a suspect within days of the explosion. For
weeks following the incident, "a horde of news media members campled outside his
mother's apartment ... where Jewell live[d]." Bill Rankin, Jewell is Cleared in Bomb
Case: No Longer a 'Target,' Feds Say, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 27, 1996, at Al.
135. See Rankin, supra, at Al.
136. Jewell settled his claims against NBC and CNN for undisclosed amounts. Suits
against the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, and the New York Post, are pending. See
Jewell v. NYP Holdings, 23 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also Charles L.
Babcock & Cami Dawson Boyd, Can Suspects Sue the Media for Coverage of Investi-
gations?, 15 COMM. LAW. 3 (Summer 1997); Judge Lets Jewell Continue Suit, FLORIDA
TODAY, Oct. 3, 1998, at 3A.
137. See Davidson v. Time Warner, 25 Media L. Rep. 1705 (S.D. Tex. 1997). The
plaintiffs argued in this suit that 2Pacalypse Now did not merit First Amendment pro-
tection because it was obscene, contained "fighting words," defamed police officers
and tended to incite imminent illegal conduct on the part of individuals like the of-
ficer's killer. The court, however, granted summary judgment to the defendants.
138. See Jason Talerman, Note. The Death of Tupac: Will Gangsta Rap Kill the
First Amendment?, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 117, 137 (1994) (noting that both Rep-
resentative Susan Molinari and Oliver North cited Time Warner's profit motive as
contrary to constitutional protection).
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to these objections and support of the censorship by public offi-
cials, musician Ice-T voluntarily withdrew "Cop Killer" from Body
Count.139 Two weeks after Ice-T pulled the song, he and other rap
artists met with Warner Group. The musicians were told to change
their lyrics or find another label. 4°
III: Analysis of the Debate
"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death
your right to say it."'' These words by Voltaire echo the senti-
ments of both the media and their lawyers, when it comes to de-
fending the First Amendment. Paladin and Khawar question
whether it is permissible - and proper - for the media to support
parties in a litigation who have, by social, moral and journalistic
standards, acted inappropriately. They also question whether it is
unethical for lawyers to support the media's attempts to defend
such conduct.
The answer to the first question, according to Judge Luttig, and
other critics like Chief Judge Richard Posner and Mike Wallace, is
that it is not proper.'42 Anti-media sentiment has grown tremen-
dously in recent years, to the point where a recent Roper-Freedom
Forum-Parade poll states that fewer than twenty percent of people
polled rated the ethics of journalists as high, and sixty-five percent
of respondents said there are times when publication or broadcast
should be prevented. 43 For those who wish to maintain the pres-
tige of journalism, it may be critical to point out defendants who
give the profession a bad name.
Ultimately though, it is wrong to criticize the media and their
amici for defending their peers. There are compelling explanations
that indicate that the scores of media who have sided with such
defendants have made the right decision. One of the most impor-
tant reasons is that a media client may think it has a legitimate
interest in the outcome of the case purely from a precedential
standpoint - the case law may be unclear or non-existent. If this is
the case, then the media are only protecting their First Amendment
freedoms, and their actions are proper.
139. See id. at 135.
140. See id.
141. Talerman, supra note 138, at 117 (citing Voltaire).
142. See supra notes 64-69, 129-31 and accompanying text.
143. See ROPER CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, NEWS JUNKIES, NEWS
CRITICS: How AMERICANS USE THE NEWS AND WHAT THEY THINK ABOUT IT (Feb.
1997), cited in Daniel Schorr, Forgive Us Our Press Passes, 20 HASTINGS COMMIENT.
L.J. 269, 271 (Winter 1998).
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A. The Goals of an Amicus
The first step in the analysis of Judge Luttig's and Mike Wal-
lace's arguments is defining precisely the goals of an amicus curiae.
Judge Posner argues that many amicus briefs are simply redundant,
echoing the parties' briefs rather than giving new legal analysis,
and are thus detrimental, not legitimate. 44 In Ryan v. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission,45 the amicus claimed to have an
overriding interest in the case because the defendant was one of its
members. Accordingly, it wanted to express its view that the evi-
dence clearly established the lack of any need for the sanction im-
posed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.146 Judge
Posner replied that the court is helped only "by being pointed to
considerations germane to our decision of the appeal that the par-
ties for one reason or another have not brought to our attention,"
not by an amicus' "expression of a 'strongly held view' about the
weight of the evidence.' 1 47 Judge Posner's point is well taken. Ap-
pellate judges are flooded with briefs on both sides of the argu-
ment, and many attorneys understand that the courts should not be
compelled to read additional briefs that merely scream "me
too. "1
48
Putting the redundancy argument aside, parties in an amicus cu-
riae brief do not necessarily support a defendant's conduct alleged
by the plaintiff. Instead, they may provide the court a legal analy-
sis illustrating why a decision will be bad precedent for other simi-
larly situation parties.1 49 In addition, they may focus the court's
attention on the broader implications of various possible rulings. 50
There are also times when, because of page limitations on the
briefs of parties to the litigation, or because of other considera-
tions, an amicus may be in a better position to make a specific
point than a party to the litigation. For example, in Metromedia v.
San Diego,'5' San Francisco sought to exclude most billboards from
144. See supra notes 64-68, and accompanying text.
145. 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997).
146. See id.
147. Id. at 1064.
148. Thomas R. Newman & Steven J. Ahmuty, Jr., Justifying the Filing of Amicus
Briefs, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 2, 1998, at 3.
149. See, e.g., Brief for the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, as
Amicus Curiae, Haddle v. Garrison, 132 F.3d 46 (11th Cir. 1997) (arguing that the
lower court decision would deny the protections afforded in section 1985(2) to indi-
viduals working under employment contracts of indefinite length).
150. See Ennis, supra note 50, at 608.
151. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
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designated sections of the city. 152 The billboards carried primarily
commercial messages, but also some political messages as well.
Billboard owners were not in a position to argue credibly on behalf
of political speech because they did not engage in political speech
(they leased billboard space only), and so the billboard owners'
lawyer invited the ACLU to file an amicus brief emphasizing the
political speech aspects of the case. 153
Other legitimate reasons for filing amicus briefs include clarify-
ing convoluted litigation, collecting useful historical or factual ref-
erences that merit judicial notice or urging limitations on rulings.154
It is imperative to the adversary system that an amicus with legiti-
mate interests be able to assert its arguments. Thus, it can be
deemed ethical for an amicus party to submit a brief where that
party is motivated by one of the enumerated reasons.
B. Legitimate Interests
It is clear that Judge Luttig, Mike Wallace and their peers, saw
few, if any, legitimate interests expressed by the amici who filed in
the Paladin and Globe cases. However, there are strong arguments
for amici involvement in both Paladin and Khawar. In these cases,
it is not necessarily whom the media stood behind, but the constitu-
tional right each supported that legitimized each interest. Thus,
the media amici pass a "legitimate interest" test that refute the crit-
ics' notions of the amici's decision to file in the litigation.
1. Paladin's Critics and the Brandenburg Precedent
In Paladin, the amici articulated a chilling effect argument 155 that
the District Court accepted. However, the Fourth Circuit rejected
this claim, arguing that:
152. See id.
153. See Ennis, supra note 50, at 607. The majority of the Court in Metromedia
agreed to strike down the San Diego ordinance. The four justices in the plurality
"thought the ordinance was constitutional insofar as it regulated only commercial
speech, but struck down the entire ordinance because it unconstitutionally regulated
political speech, and the commercial and political regulations were not severable." Id.
154. See ABC Paladin Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 128.
155. See id. The Amici concluded:
A word, a lyric, a film clip - these are the living embodiments of our proud heritage
of defending the rights of even the most outrageous speaker. They are capable of
enriching, entertaining, educating, and - occasionally - shocking and horrifying us.
But whatever their power, they are incapable of acting. To hold a word or an image
jointly responsible for even the most ghastly criminal act diminishes us all, because it
means that some speech surely will be chilled in the process.
Id. at 28.
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[F]or almost any broadcast, book, movie or song that one can
imagine, an inference of unlawful motive from the description
or depiction of particular criminal conduct therein would almost
never be reasonable, for not only will there be ... a legitimate
and lawful purpose for these communications, but the contexts
in which the descriptions or depictions appear will themselves
negate a purpose on the part of the producer or publisher to
assist others in their undertaking of the described or depicted
conduct. 1
56
The crux of the majority's criticism was that because Paladin ad-
mitted that it intended and knew the book would be used "immedi-
ately in the commission of murder and other crimes[,]' 1 57 this case
did not affect any First Amendment principles. The court's argu-
ment focused on Paladin's actions, and its intent to publish danger-
ous speech.
Despite the court's assertion, the chilling effect that reversal of
the District Court's summary judgment would have on subsequent
media conduct was a valid concern for the media amici. The media
did not cheer for Paladin, nor did they argue that the book was
necessary. Furthermore, they did not condone the type of violence
advocated in Paladin Press' books. Instead, the Paladin amici ar-
gued there was no distinction between the constitutional protection
for the type of information found in Hit Man, and protection for
similar information found in "a vast array of fiction, nonfiction,
music, electronic communication, and video programming.' '1 58
The media's position is reasonable and passes a legitimacy test.
It was in the media's best interest in Paladin to advocate for First
Amendment freedoms. The media generally strive to extend First
Amendment protections as much as possible, thereby alleviating
concerns about potential lawsuits. 159 In this case, the media enti-
ties were worried that the precedent set by a reversal of summary
judgment for the defendant would subject information in books to
censure review by trial.160
156. Paladin, 128 F.3d at 266.
157. Id. at 265.
158. ABC Paladin Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 2.
159. For example, the media have previously stood behind defendants like Hustler
Magazine. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (prohibiting public
figures and officials from recovering damages for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress without showing a false statement of fact being made with actual
malice); Hustler v. Herceg, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a Hustler arti-
cle did not incite an adolescent to perform an act that led to his death).
160. See ABC Paladin Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 22. The ABC Paladin Amicus
Brief states:
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Because it is unclear how restrictive the limits set by Branden-
burg v. Ohio 161 are, it is in the media's interests to ensure that such
protections continue. Because Brandenburg has almost exclusively
been applied to political speech, 62 some Paladin supporters won-
der whether its First Amendment protections would extend to Pal-
adin if it had written a chapter in its book extolling the virtues of
contract killing. 63 It was this type of arbitrary line-drawing that
the amici attempted to defend themselves against.
2. The Globe and Neutral Reportage
Mike Wallace and Howard Kurtz presented a similar argument
to that of Judge Luttig. Wallace's "60 Minutes" interview with
Khalid Khawar occurred before the California Supreme Court
ruled on the case."6 Criticizing the media's defense of Paladin,
Wallace noted that "[t]his case is about Khalid Khawar, who was
libeled. The jury found that he had been libeled. An appellate
court agreed. That's what the case is about. It's about a human
being and his family.' '1 65
Nevertheless, the media amici make several compelling argu-
ments that this case was about more than the facts. There was an
important legal issue at stake - the application of neutral reportage
to public figures. "[T]he neutral reportage privilege protects the
media from defamation liability for the non-malicious publication
of a serious accusation made by a prominent person where such
accusations in and of themselves are newsworthy, while preserving
the private figure's right to seek damages from the original pub-
lisher."'1 66 The impact of the Khawar litigation would not be lim-
ited to tabloids like the Globe or the Enquirer, but also to the
A decision that allows this claim to survive - even for a brief time - will have
a destabilizing effect on First Amendment law, and will inevitably unleash a
hailstorm of derivative suits on the communications industry as plaintiffs
search for deep pockets to avenge imagined affronts, or real affronts better
recompensed by perpetrator than publisher.
Id. See also supra notes 26-31 (providing examples of this premise) and accompany-
ing text.
161. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
162. See Robert J. Coursey III, Note & Comment, Another Case of Freedom vs.
Safety: Stretching the First Amendment to Protect the Publication of Murder Manuals
- Brandenburg Need Not Apply?, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 875, 899 (1998).
163. See id. at 899-900.
164. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 6, 1998).
165. Id.
166. L.A. Times Amicus Brief, supra note 120, at 24.
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mainstream press; and there was the possibility that future courts
may eliminate neutral reportage altogether. 167
The amici expressed additional concern about the Court of Ap-
peals ruling - that failure to reinvestigate a story constitutes "ac-
tual malice" if the court later concludes that the book's assertions
were improbable.16 The brief filed on behalf of ABC noted that
where the media simply informs the public of the "historical fact"
that allegations have been made, and do not report the allegations
as true or otherwise distort them, then "the media cannot be held
liable because the report was 'materially true' and thus 'constitu-
tionally protected.' 1 69
In addition, the brief filed by Davis, Wright and Tremaine, attor-
neys for the amici curiae, including the Los Angeles Times, NBC,
and the New York Times, argue that a ruling mandating a duty of
independent investigation resurrects strict scrutiny.170 In this por-
tion of the brief, there are only brief mentions of the Globe case;
the rest of the argument is a strictly legal analysis.
What the amici stress - and what people like Mike Wallace and
Howard Kurtz largely ignore - is that it is not necessarily Paladin,
or the Globe, that the media amici are defending. Instead, the
amici's primary goal is to protect the constitutional rights guaran-
teed and extended by the First Amendment. In the final paragraph
of the Paladin amicus curiae brief, amici note that "[r]einstatement
of this case will engender a new tort against the written word - a
futile exercise in 'pigeonholing' [that] endangers the pigeon."' 1
C. Legitimate Interests of Lawyers
If there is a compelling and legitimate interest of the media
amici, the same conclusion can be reached for the lawyers who
write the amicus for their media clients. As noted above, there are
167. See Jane Kirtley, Defamation Judgment Puts Onus on Media, AM. JOURNALISM
REv., Jan. 1, 1999. Kirtley stated:
Future courts may interpret the ruling as creating a creating a legal obliga-
tion to independently investigate defamatory statements made by authorita-
tive sources before repeating them. That may be a desirable journalistic
aspiration. But courts are ill equipped to second-guess news judgment or
allocation of resources. You can bet they'll seldom be satisfied that a re-
porter did all he or she could to determine the truth.
Id.
168. See Khawar v. Globe, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 92 (Ct. App. 1996).
169. ABC Khawar Amicus Brief, supra note 120, at 20.
170. L.A. Times Brief, supra note 166, at 9.
171. ABC Paladin Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 27 (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AM.
CONSTrTUTIONAL L. §§ 12-18, at 943 (2d ed. 1988)).
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many reasons, why the media amici have a vested interest in de-
fending their peers. If that is the case, and an appellate decision
may affect future litigation for the lawyer's client, that lawyer has
an obligation to serve the amici's interests.
Even if that were not the case - even if the media had been
misguided - there still may be the ethical obligation of the amici's
lawyers to advocate for their clients. There are no ABA Model
Rule or Code provisions that deal specifically with advocating for a
non-client in a case that may have an effect on a current client.
However, there are several general comments that provide a good
basis for analysis.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules")
require a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client. 172 The Model Rules further state that "a
lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposi-
tion, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may
take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindi-
cate a client's cause or endeavor."' 73 An amicus brief would likely
fall within the ambit of "lawful and ethical measures."
The Model Rules also note that a lawyer should act with commit-
ment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf.174 The Model Code of Profes-
sional Conduct ("Model Code") similarly notes that a lawyer
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.175
An attorney's ethical obligation to assist the judge or jury in arriv-
ing at its distillation of the "truth" is best fulfilled through the zeal-
ous advocacy of the client's position under the existing paradigm of
civil litigation. 76 The attorney's primary obligation is to pursue -
to the fullest extent of the law - his or her client's rights. 77
172. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.3 (1983).
173. Id. Rule 1.3 cmt. 1.
174. See id. Rule'1.3 cmt. 1.
175. MODEL CODE Cannon 7. Some states have moved to eliminate the word
"zeal" in their Codes of Professional Responsibility because a lawyer on behalf of a
client might interpret zealousness to mean "zealotry," justifying wrongful conduct. It
might also be interpreted to imply a requirement of personal involvement rather than
detached commitment. See George A. Riemer, Zealous Lawyers: Saints or Sinners?,
59 OCT. OR. ST. B. BULL. 31, 32 (1998). An in-depth analysis of this point is beyond
the scope of this article.
176. Jamil N. Alibhai et al., Zealous Advocacy and the Search for Truth, 61 TEX.
B.J. 1009, 1014 (1998).
177. See id.
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Rule 1.3 of the Model Rules tangentially addresses the role of a
lawyer when the relationship is ongoing; it states that if a lawyer
has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters,
the client can assume that the lawyer will serve on a continuing
basis. 78
Finally, it is up to the client to determine the objective of the
litigation. 179 Logically, it seems that if the objectives of a client are
to prevent bad precedent for possible future litigation, it is the obli-
gation of the lawyer to represent his or her client in that matter.
However, the rules also state that a lawyer has professional discre-
tion in determining the means by which a matter should be pur-
sued.' 8° It is, however, within the ethical boundaries that a lawyer
pursue any objectives of the client.' 8 '
The Model Rules provide an escape hatch for an attorney. A
lawyer may withdraw from a matter if the client insists on pursuing
an objective that the lawyer finds repugnant or imprudent.'82
However, it would be hard in these cases for a lawyer to prove that
such objections are repugnant to him or her.
When taken collectively, it becomes clear that there is no ethical
problem with a lawyer writing a brief on behalf of an interested
third party. Furthermore, if there is a legal avenue for that client
to take, there may even be an obligation to pursue such a course of
action. If a lawyer is within his or her boundaries to promote an
objective of an interested media client, there is no reason why that
attorney should be required to withdraw, especially if the lawyer is
not particularly disturbed by the behavior the media client wants to
uphold. 83 In tandem with the idea that an attorney should repre-
sent a client zealously, it only makes sense that writing amicus
briefs falls within the ambit of responsible lawyering.
178. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cmt. 3 ("[A] lawyer should carry through to con-
clusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a
specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a
lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client
sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue, to serve on a continuing basis
unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal.").
179. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2.
180. See id.
181. The exception, of course, is to perpetuate or aid in the commission of a crime.
See MODEL RULES Rule 1.16 cmt. 2. See also MODEL CODE at DR 2-110(b).
182. MODEL RULES Rule 1.16.
183. It is useful to note that a lawyer's representation of a client, including repre-
sentation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political,
economic, social, or moral views or activities. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(b).
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If it is not unethical on the part of media entities and their law-
yers to advocate as amici on behalf of a media defendants,184 why,
in these cases, do some members of the media shy away from de-
fending organizations such as the Globe and Paladin Press? A
plausible reason may be that the press and other media would like
to distance themselves as much as possible from tabloids or "alter-
native" publishing companies such as Paladin. When Howard
Kurtz notes in Mike Wallace's "60 Minutes" interview with
Khawar, that "we should [not] apologize for the worst excesses in
our business," he adds, "I think we should blow the whistle on
them.'1 85 The media have been accused of tabloid journalism for
years, 86 and some journalists wonder aloud how to rise above the
stereotypes. 87
Many authors of articles and discussions regarding these cases
defend Paladin and the Globe, 88 but even more still distance
themselves from the publishers.18 9 However, "[t]hese are hardly
the kinds of facts that First Amendment lawyers die for," writes
one editor about the Paladin case. 19° "But as is so often the case
with constitutional rights, they must defend the most unsavory
characters ... to protect the rest of us.' 91 '
It is unlikely that in either Paladin or Khawar, the mainstream
media would publish these types of articles or books. The media
are loosely governed by their own set of rules that the Society of
Professional Journalists ("SPJ") promulgated in its Code of Ethics
in 1926, and revised in 1973, 1984, 1987 and 1996.192 The rules pro-
184. The only caveat is that a lawyer may not further a crime or fraud. See MODEL
CODE at 7-102.
185. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 6, 1998).
186. See generally JAMES FALLOWS, BREAKING THE NEWS: How HE MEDIA UN-
DERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1996) (criticizing major news organizations for
accelerating the decline of journalism); HOWARD KURTZ, HOT AIR: ALL TALK ALL
THE TIME (1996) (saying that the press have given into sensationalism).
187. See, e.g., Jon Lafayette, RTNDA: Journalists Hash Out Trust Issue: Has Credi-
bility Eroded?, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Sept. 22, 1997, at 1A. The article describes the
Radio-Television News Directors Association's annual conference where speakers
discussed accountability to the public. Id.
188. See, e.g., Andrea Neal, In Defense of the Most Unsavory, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Mar. 14, 1996, at A8 (defending Paladin Press, stating that "the information found in
Hit Man can be found in other works of fiction and non-fiction"); Kirtley, supra note
167 ("My support for self-criticism [by the media] stops at the courthouse door.").
189. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 100 ("[D]rawing sensible lines is the hallmark of
enlightened law .... The First Amendment is no exception.").
190. Neal, supra note 188.
191. Id.
192. David A. Logan, "Stunt Journalism," Professional Norms, and the Public Mis-
trust of the Media, 9 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 151, 160 (1998).
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vided for journalists, unlike the Codes, do not come with the threat
of disciplinary procedures if they are not followed.193 In addition,
the journalism codes that are in place deal only in generalities.194
For example, the American Society of Newspaper Editors calls for
"the highest ethical and professional performance," in its "State-
ment of Principles" but does not define that term.195 "[T]here is an
obligation on the part of each editor, each reporter, each publisher,
to decide upon her or his own ethical standard," says respected
journalist A.M. Rosenthal. 196 "I do not believe in regulation of the
newspaper business from the outside, and philosophically, I have to
be against regulation from the inside. I do not want to sit in judg-
ment on another newspaper and I do not think it is a healthy thing
to do."
197
Moreover, the press have no guidelines with regard to assisting
media defendants - most likely they will do what is in their best
interests for their own publications. If this is the case, then it might
be in the best interest for a single publication to discredit a defend-
ant or media amici to uphold its own integrity.
Conclusion
For those who chose to criticize the media entities that signed on
to the Paladin and Globe amicus briefs, it may be that these critics
have false views of what it means to write an amicus brief.
Although the one understanding of amici has come to be advocacy
for a certain client, 98 many amici - and in fact those that are prob-
ably most effective - are those who argue a legal issue without
zealously advocating for a specific defendant. 99 This is actually a
return to where amici have stood since the 1800s - as a friend to
the court and to the law.
However, it may also be the case that a new rule of law would be
a crucial defensive or offensive tactic for a party. In such cases,
regardless of the enthusiasm for with which a friend advocates, it
193. Deann Evans, Most Journalists Follow Basic Ethical Rules, SALT LAKE TRIB-
UNE, May 22, 1994, at F4.
194. See Brian Murchison et al., Sullivan's Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial
Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 7, 100 (1994).
195. American Society of Newspaper Editor, Statement of Principles (visited June
25, 1999) <http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/principl.htm>.
196. Remarks by A.M. Rosenthal, ASNE 1987, Proceedings of the 1987 Conven-
tion of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, at 36, 45, cited in, Murchison,
supra note 194, at 101.
197. Id.
198. For history of amicus briefs, see supra Part I.
199. See ACLU cases, supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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would set a bad precedent to condemn amici who stand up for their
peers and the law.
